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et al.: Establishment of Religion

ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
N.Y. CoNsT. art. X

§ 3:

Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its
property or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit
either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or
maintenance... of any school or institution of learning wholly
or in part under the control or direction or any religious
denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine
is taught, but the legislature may provide for the transportation
of children to andfrom any school or institutionof learning.
U.S. CONST. amend. I:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion...
SUPREME COURT
ALBANY COUNTY
Grumet v. Cuomo1
(decided March 8, 1995)

Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the implementation of Chapter 241
of the New York Session Laws of 19942 on the basis that it
violated the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution3 and Article XI, section 3 of the New York State
1. 164 Misc. 2d 644, 625 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1995).
2. Id. at 648, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. See 1994 N.Y. Laws 241. Chapter
241 of the Laws of 1994 provides in pertinent part:
Any municipality situated within a single central or union free school
district, but whose boundaries are not coterminous with the boundaries
of such school district, may organize a new union free school district,
pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, consisting of the entire
territory of such municipality, whenever the educational interests of the
community require it.
Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause provides "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... ." Id.
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Constitution. 4 The Supreme Court of Albany County held that
the enactment of Chapter 241 served a secular purpose, did not
endorse religion, and did not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion and, therefore, the Establishment
Clause was not violated. 5 The court also held that the school
district was not under the control or direction of the Satmar sect,
and, thus, there was no violation of Section 3 of Article XI of the
New York State Constitution. 6 Based on the foregoing, the court
held that the plaintiffs failed to raise any cognizable constitutional
claim with respect to the challenged statute, and granted
7
summary judgment to the defendants.
The Incorporated Village of Kiryas Joel in the Town of
Monroe, Orange County, is a homogenous religious community
whose citizens all belong to the Satmar Hassidim sect. 8 The
Satmars follow a strictly religious lifestyle, and most of the
Satmar children attend private religious academies. 9 However,
there are some handicapped children who cannot be provided for
in the parochial schools. 10 Public schooling for these children
was provided by the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District
outside the boundaries of Kiryas Joel. 11 Many of the children's
parents eventually deemed this unsatisfactory. 12 Most of these
children were eventually removed from the public schools due to
4. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3. This section provides in pertinent part:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or
credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used,
directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination
or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part
under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in
which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the legislature
may provide for the transportation of children to and from any school or
institution of learning.
Id.
5. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 653, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.

6. Id. at 655, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1007-08.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 646, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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"the panic, fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving
their own community and being with people whose ways were so
different."13
The New York State Legislature attempted to resolve the
controversy by enacting Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989.14 This

created the Kiryas Joel Village School District, which was to
consist of the territory of the Village of Kiryas Joel.15 The

district provided special education services to the handicapped
children of Kiryas Joel and other handicapped children from
beyond the Village." 16 Consequently, the United States Supreme

Court in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet17 found the statute to be a violation of the Establishment
Clause and held it unconstitutional. 18 A plurality of the Justices

deemed the legislature's act to be the equivalent of "defining a
political subdivision," 19 the result of which was a "purposeful
and forbidden fusion of governmental and religious functions." 20

13. Id. at 646, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1002-03 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of
Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 181, 527
N.E.2d 767, 770, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 892 (1988)).
14. Id. at 646-47, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. See 1989 N.Y. Laws 748.
Chapter 748 provides in pertinent part:
1. The territory of the Village of Kiryas Joel in the Town of Monroe,
Orange County, on a date when this act shall take effect, shall be and
hereby is constituted a separate school district, and shall be kmown as
the Kiryas Joel Village School District and shall have and enjoy all the
powers and duties of a union free school district under the provisions of
the Education Law.
2. Such district shall be under the control of a Board of Education,
which shall be composed of from five to nine members elected by the
qualified voters of the Village of Kiryas Joel, said members to serve for
terms not exceeding five years.
3. This act shall take effect on the first day of July next succeeding the
date on which it shall have become a law.
Id.
15. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 646-47, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
16. Id. at 647, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
17. 114 S.Ct. 2481 (1994).
18. Id. at 2485.
19. Id. at 2490.
20. Id.
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Days after Grumet was decided by the Supreme Court, the
New York State Legislature enacted Chapters 24121 and 27922 of
the Laws of 1994.23 Chapter 279 repealed Chapter 748 of the
Laws of 1989 and "abolished the Kiryas Joel Village School

District." 24 Chapter 241 of the Laws of 1994 affected an
amendment to section 1504 of the Education Law 25 "to permit
every city, town or village .... to organize a new union free
school district ... whenever the educational interests of the
community require it if certain additional requirements are
fulfilled." 26 Soon after the enactment of Chapter 241, the
Monroe-Woodbury Board of Education voted to create a new
school district for the Village of Kiryas Joel. 27 The school
district was approved by a vote of the residents of Kiryas Joel,
28
and the new school district was created two days later.

21. See supra note 2.
22. 1994 N.Y. Laws 279. Chapter 279, section 2 provides:
Chapter 748 of the laws of 1989 relating to establishing a separate
school district is REPEALED, the Kiryas Joel Village School District is
hereby abolished and, for the purpose of article 31 of the education law,
the territory comprising the Village of Kiryas Joel shall be deemed to be
part of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, until such
territory is formally consolidated with, annexed by, replaced by or
superseded by a new or existing school district pursuant to such article
31 of the education law.
Id.
23. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 647, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
24. Id. at 646-47, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
25. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1504 (McKinney 1994). This section provides in
pertinent part:
Any municipality situated wholly within a single central or union free
school district, but whose boundaries are not coterminous with the
boundaries of such school district, may organize a new union free
school district, pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, consisting
of the entire territory of such municipality, whenever the educational
interests of the community require it.
26. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 648, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
27. Id. at 648, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
28. Id.
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Plaintiff's first claim 29 was that Chapter 241 violated the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. In
addressing this claim, the court recognized the broad principle
that "[tihe First Amendment's guarantee that 'Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion' is more than
a pledge that no single religion will be designated as a state
religion." 30 Quoting from Committee for Public Education and

Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,3 1 the court stated that the
Establishment Clause "proscribes sponsorship, financial support,
32
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."
The court then applied the test set forth in Lemon v.
29. Prior to addressing plaintiffs' claims on the merits, the court first
evaluated whether plaintiffs had standing to bring the action. Id. at 649, 625
N.Y.S.2d at 1004. The court looked to County of Rensselaer v. Regan, 173
A.D.2d 37, 578 N.Y.S.2d 274 (3rd Dep't 1991), wherein it was held that
where a plaintiff is asserting a proprietary claim of "entitlement to a specific
fund," that plaintiff has standing to "challenge the validity of subsequent
legislation impairing their entitlement to that fund." Id. at 40, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
276. The court then applied Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kifyas Joel
Sch. Dist., 187 A.D.2d 16, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (3rd Dep't 1992), which held
that citizen taxpayers "have statutory standing to maintain an action for
declaratory or injunctive relief to prevent the unconstitutional disbursement of
state funds" and that the formation of a new school district which is the
recipient of state funds can be challenged in a citizen taxpayer action. Id. at
20, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 126. Based on the foregoing, the court in the present
action found that the "uncontroverted allegations in the complaint clearly show
that each plaintiff meets the definition of citizen taxpayer ...and, therefore,
they have statutory standing to maintain an action for declaratory or injunctive
relief to prevent the unconstitutional disbursement of state funds." Grmmet, 164
Misc. 2d at 649, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1004 (citations omitted). Having established
that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the statute, the court moved on to
the merits of the action. Id.
30. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 649, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1004 (quoting School
Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 474 U.S. 373, 381 (1985) (stating that the
Establishment Clause is more encompassing than a "mere injunction that
governmental programs discriminating among religions are unconstitutional")).
31. 413 U.S. 756, 763-64 (1973) (holding that while the State has a duty
"to insure the health, welfare and safety" of nonpublic school children, the
Establishment Clause prohibits the State from any active involvement in
religious activity).
32. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 649, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1004 (citations
omitted).
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Kurtzman33 in order to determine the constitutionality of Chapter
241. 3 4 The court recognized that "[a]lthough criticized, the
Lemon case provides a sound analytical framework and there is
clearly no consensus on a substitute" 3 5 and that "[a]bsent an
announced abandonment of Lemon by the Supreme Court, it
remains the law and shall be applied." 3 6 Having established that
the Lemon test is the proper method for analyzing the issue, the

court noted that "[t]here is no evidence in the record to suggest
that the school is operated in a manner other than that required of
a New York Public School" 37 and that under the Lemon test a

"'court may invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly by
an impermissible purpose, if its primary effect is the
advancement of religion, or if it requires excessive entanglement
between church and state.'38

The court analyzed plaintiffs' claim under the first prong of the
Lemon test to determine if Chapter 241 served a secular
purpose. 3 9

The

court

identified

the

secular

purpose

as

"afford[ing] municipalities, whose residents believe it in their

best educational interests, the opportunity to create a new school
district where certain religion-neutral and objective requirements
33. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test set forth in the case, referred to as the
"Lemon test," is a three part test which holds that when a statute serves a non
secular purpose, excessively entangles the state with religion, or has a primary
effect of endorsing religion, the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 612-13.
Justice Scalia had this to say about the Lemon test: "Like some ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school
attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District." Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993)
(concurring). The majority countered: "[w]hile we are somewhat diverted by
Justice Scalia's evening at the cinema, we return to the reality that there is a
proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon, however frightening it
may be to some, has not been overruled." Id. at 2148 n.7.
34. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 649, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
35. Id. at 650, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1004-05.
36. Id. at 650, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
37. Id. at 650, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/24

6

et al.: Establishment of Religion

1996]

ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION

891

are satisfied." 40 The court found that Chapter 241 was "a general
law drawn in neutral terms," 4 1 and that "there was nothing to
suggest that the Legislature 'was entirely motivated by a purpose
to advance religion.'" 42
Addressing the emerging "endorsement" test, the court found
that "the New York Legislature had neither 'endorse[d] [n]or
disapprove[d] of religion' in the enactment of Chapter 241, but
has, at most, permissibly accommodated the Satmars without
singling them out for favorable treatment.'"43 The court
contrasted Chapter 241 with Chapter 748, finding that whereas
Chapter 748 conferred a special benefit on the Satmars, "Chapter
241 provide[d] a religion-neutral mechanism available for all
qualifying municipalities." 44 On that basis, the court concluded
that the primary purpose of Chapter 241 was not religious "but
instead [was] valid and secular with at most, an ancillary purpose
of accommodating religion."45 Thus, Chapter 241 did not violate

46
the first prong of the Lemon test.
The court then turned to the second prong of the Lemon test to
decide whether the primary effect of the statute was to endorse
religion. 47 The court found that the "principal and primary effect
of Chapter 241 is the expansion of a municipality's ability to
meet its local educational needs, and.., to allow the Village of
Kiryas Joel to create its own school district and provide for the
public education of the Village's handicapped children." 48 The

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (holding that
governmental acts which advance religion fail the Lemon test, and, thus,
violate the Establishment Clause)).

43. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 651, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1005 (citations
omitted). See School Dist. of Abbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
299 (1963) (stating that the government cannot use its power to serve any
solely religious purpose, but religious needs can be accommodated through
laws that are neutral with regard to religion).
44. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 651, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
45. Id
46. Id.

47. Id. at 651, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
48. Id.
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court, citing School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 49 found
that the statute did not "convey a message of government
endorsement or disapproval." 50 Further, "there was no 'symbolic
union of church and state ... likely to be perceived by adherents
of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious
choices.' '"51 The court also stated that the Legislature maintained
the "'requisite course of neutrality' [such that] Chapter 241
neither constitutes 'direct state-funded efforts to indoctrinate
youngsters in specific religious beliefs,' nor 'fosters a close
identification of [the State government's] powers and
responsibilities with those of any or all religious
denominations. '"52
The court also cited to Widmar v. Vincent, 53 finding that
"Chapter 241 does not 'confer any imprimatur of state approval
of religious sects or practices.' ' ' 54 The court concluded that
Chapter 241 neither created nor required the creation of the
49. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
50. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 651, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1006 (quoting Ball,
473 U.S. at 389 (stating that where the government appears to endorse or
disapprove of religion such endorsement or disapproval is sufficient to fail the
Lemon test and violate the Establishment Clause)).
51. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 652, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1006 (quoting Ball,
473 U.S. at 390 (stating that a symbolic union of the government with religion
which may be perceived as an endorsement, or disapproval, is violative of the
Establishment Clause)).
52. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 652, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1006 (citation
omitted).
53. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the Court held a state university
policy, which excluded certain registered student groups from using school
facilities because membership in the groups was determined by religion, to be
an impermissible content-based regulation on free speech. Id. at 276. The
Court further stated that the policy was unnecessary to comply with the
Establishment Clause on the grounds that a religious organization's enjoyment
of merely incidental benefits does not violate the prohibition against the
primary advancement of religion. Id.
54. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 652, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1006 (quoting Widmar,
454 U.S. at 274 (stating that where the governmental actions do not manifest a
showing of governmental approval of religious practices, such actions are not
violative of the Establishment Clause)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/24

8

et al.: Establishment of Religion

1996]

ESTABLISHMENT OFRELGION

893

Kiryas Joel Village School District, nor did it prohibit the
creation of other school districts pursuant to its provisions, and,
therefore, it would not likely "be perceived as an endorsement of
the Satmar sect." 55 As a result, Chapter 241 did not violate the
56
second prong of Lemon.

The court then turned to the question of whether Chapter 241
excessively entangled the government with religion in violation of
the third prong of the Lemon test. 5 7 The court found that
excessive government entanglement was not implicated. 5 8 The
court cited to Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 5 9 and found that

Chapter 241 "d[id] not 'enmesh churches in the processes of
government and create the danger of political fragmentation and

divisiveness on religious lines.'" 60 Distinguishing Larkin, the
court found that in the present case, "there [was] no delegation of
61
government power to religious bodies as there was in Larkin."

The court concluded that in enacting Chapter 241, the New
York State Legislature neither "impaired nor debased" the spirit
of the Establishment Clause, and, therefore, the legislation is not

violative of the United States Constitution. 62
The court next turned its attention to plaintiff's claim that
Chapter 241 violated Article XI, section 3 of the New York State
Constitution by using public money "'directly or indirectly, in

aid or maintenance,... of any school or institution of learning
wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious

55. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 652, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
56. Id. (rejecting plaintiff's claim that Kiryas Joel Village School District
is the only district that can satisfy the statute's requirements).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a Massachusetts
statute which gave the governing bodies of churches and schools the power to
prevent the issuance of liquor licenses for premises within a 500-foot radius of
the church or school by objecting to the license applications).
60. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 652, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1006 (quoting Larkin,
459 U.S. at 127).
61. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 652, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1006 (pointing out that
in Larkin, "churches were given veto power over liquor license applications").
62. Id. at 653, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
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denomination' .... "63 Plaintiffs alleged that the Kiryas Joel
School District was under the control of the Satmar sect, pointing
to the fact that all members of the Board were Satmar. 64 The
court analyzed this claim in light of In re College of New
Rochelle v. Nyquist6 5 which employed a "totality of the
circumstances test."' 66 The Nyquist court stated that "mere
affiliation or a sharing of administrative control by a
denomination will not, in and of itself, bring the institution
within the proscription of [Article XI, section 3]."67 The court,
in Grumet, applied College of New Rochelle's "totality of the
circumstances" test and concluded that the mere fact that
members of the school board and the elected civic leaders are
also members of the Satmar sect did not indicate that the school
was under the control or direction of the sect. 68 As a result,
"plaintiff's claims under the [New York] State Constitution
69
[were] no stronger than under the ... Federal Constitution."
In ruling on the merits of the case, the court recognized that
when determining whether the legislation violated the
Establishment Clause, the Lemon test, though criticized, is still
the proper test to be applied. 70 However, with respect to the state
constitutional claim, rather than applying the three part Lemon
test, the court used the "totality of the circumstances" as set forth
71
in College of New Rochelle.
The New York standard requires that to establish a violation of
the New York State Constitution, the plaintiff must prove that
63. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 653, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1007 (quoting N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 3).

64. Id.
65. 37 A.D.2d 461, 466-67, 326 N.Y.S.2d 765, 771-72 (3rd Dep't 1971).
66. Id. (holding that a college founded and operated by Ursuline Nuns was
not under the control or direction of any religious denomination, nor would
state aid to the college advance or inhibit religion or result in excessive
entanglement of the state with religion).
67. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 654, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1007 (quoting College
of New Rochelle, 37 A.D.2d at 466, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 772).
68. Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 654, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
69. Id. at 655, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
70. Id. at 650, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
71. Id. at 654, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
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there is a "propagation" of religious tenets within the schools, or
that religion "pervades" the school. 72 This is a more stringent
standard than the Lemon test, where the plaintiff must prove that
there was either an excessive entanglement between church and
state, or that the act was motivated wholly by an impermissible
purpose, or that its primary effect was the advancement of
religion. 73 The court reconciled this difference by stating that
jurisprudential policy left to the New York Court of Appeals "the
function of determining that the State Constitution affords greater
or different rights than the Federal Constitution." 74 Having found
that Chapter 241 does not violate either the Federal or New York
State Constitutions, the court granted summary judgment to the
defendants. 75

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d at 655, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1007-08.
Id. at 655, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
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